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Forman et al.: Civilians in the Path of War

Grimsley, Mark, and Clifford J. Rogers, eds. Civilians in the Path of War. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2002. 280pp. $50

This edited volume of essays provides an
important set of historical case studies
about noncombatant victims of war.
From ancient Greece to the French Revolution, to strategic bombings of urban
centers in World War II and the Gulf
War, these articles address not the ethical or moral dimensions of war but
rather the military calculus in planning
violence against enemies that could also
endanger or kill civilians. This collection
gives historical perspective to the concept of collateral damage.
In their introduction the editors state,
“This book is about occasions in which
soldiers and governments have deliberately attacked the helpless.” The authors provide specific, highly detailed
examples, removed from the lens of
morality and judgement, of the “whys”
of strategic interventions. It is difficult,
however, not to document the uncertainty that accompanies military decision making, as author Conrad Crane
describes in his article, “Contrary to
Our National Ideals.” In spite of the
important strategic use of American
airpower to exact a toll on cities during
World War II, he explains how American public opinion shifted against such
ruthless bombings. The concept of
“surgical strikes” by airpower was a
concept conceived in part to assuage
public opinion that rejected the indiscriminate use of force to destroy
noncombatants.
Nine essays, originally commissioned as
part of a 1993 conference on military
history, reveal a central ambivalence by
the authors about the impact of
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military imposed violence on civilians.
These historical cases try to balance
what generals depict as a military necessity for bombings or invasions against
the realities of on-the-ground conditions, which reveal large numbers of civilians getting in harm’s way. What is
frequently developed in the name of
military necessity is often immoral in
practice. Certainly, this is the conclusion of Holger Herwig in his “The Immorality of Expediency,” which takes
on German military planning and the
exclusion of civilians from such discussions on the eve of World War I.
Williamson Murray’s “Not Enough
Collateral Damage: Moral Ambiguities
in the Gulf War,” extols the use of
American airpower to seek “surgical
strikes” to minimize the loss of life on
the ground but also points out that
such an approach does not always produce decisive military victory. He recalls
that even in Vietnam, with General
Curtis LeMay’s “bomb them back into
the Stone Age” approach, such bombing
did not persuade the North Vietnamese
not to pursue their military course.
While all the essays provide a strong
historical overview of how noncombatants have fared in the course of warfare,
it is difficult to understand how such a
published volume could omit important lessons from the post–Cold War,
given the gap of nine years between the
commissioning of papers and publications. There is no essay about the genocide in Rwanda, where research shows
that a military force positioned in early
April 1994 could have averted tremendous loss of life. Moreover, in such intrastate conflicts as Chechnya, where
the Russian military has turned on not
only rebel guerilla groups but also the
civilian population, the nature of these
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new wars has also changed the rules about
who is a combatant. Even more recent
is the case of Kosovo, where Serbian
military commanders deliberately targeted civilians as a means of staving off
NATO air strikes. It has been precisely
the importance of noncombatants as
victims in the post–Cold War era that
has been the central feature of internal
conflicts and has distinguished these recent intrastate wars. Yet no essay in this
volume brings the historical cases up to
the present.
This anthology is useful for historians
looking backward for examples or precedents. However, the book will not
work for everyday classroom teaching
without supplementation, because the
case studies omit some of the more
current examples, as mentioned above.
Finally, the editors should have added a
final essay about the Geneva Conventions and other public humanitarian
law. The rules of modern warfare and
the centrality of protecting civilians
cannot be divorced from the planning
of any intervention. As the United
States enters a new era of strategic doctrine and preemption, it is especially
important that writing about war include not only the details of decision
making but also the implications that
such acts have on civilians who might
be caught in the middle.
JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN

Senior Program Officer
Peace, Security, Human Rights
United Nations Foundation
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Winkler, David F. Cold War at Sea: High-Seas
Confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2000. 263pp. $45

Although the Cold War ended more
than a decade ago, its impact continues
to haunt the international community
to this day. These two excellent works
from the Naval Institute Press will
greatly enhance our understanding of
this uncertain period.
Norman Friedman’s Fifty Year War is
a broad look at the conflict between
East and West. Friedman contends
that the Cold War actually began in
Spain in 1937, “when Stalin tried to hijack the ongoing civil war.” This divide
between the Soviet Union and the
West would not come to an end until
1991. Friedman poses several questions: “Should or did the West understand events in the Soviet Union? Did
the West in fact defeat the Soviet Union,
or did the Soviet Union defeat itself?
Was the Cold War, then, about communism versus capitalism or was it
about old-fashioned Russian imperialism, cloaked in a largely irrelevant
ideology?”
Friedman contends that the Cold War
was in fact a “real war” fought in slow
motion. It was also a war lost by the
Soviet Union for sociopolitical, economic, and ideological reasons. In the
end, Friedman sees Mikhail Gorbachev
as responsible for its collapse, because
he “never understood that his state was
built on terror, not on any kind of popular support.”
While making these arguments,
Friedman also includes some very scary
Cold War near misses, including a 1960
mistake by the new U.S. radar at Thule
that interpreted the moon as a Soviet
missile attack. Also intriguing is
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